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CHARTING THE REHNQUIST COURT'S COURSE:
HOW THE CENTER FOLDS, HOLDS, AND SHIFTS
DAVID M. O'BRIEN*
"Power,

not

reason,

is

the

new

currency

of this

Court's

decisionmaking."' Those are the words of the last liberal on the Supreme
Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall. In his last opinion issued from the
bench, dissenting in Payne v. Tennessee, Justice Marshall lamented the
majority's overturning of two precedents, Booth v. Maryland2 and South
Carolina v. Gathers,3 in which bare majorities barred the use of "victimimpact" statements during the sentencing stage of capital trials.4
Predicting that scores of other liberal precedents were now in jeopardy,5

he castigated the newly emergent majority on the "Rehnquist Court,"

observing that, "Neither the law nor the facts supporting Booth and
Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the personnel
of this Court did." 6
Within hours of handing down his dissent in Payne v. Tennessee,
Justice Marshall announced that he would retire upon the confirmation of
his successor. 7 Appointed in 1967, at the height of the liberal-egalitarian
revolution forged in constitutional law by the Warren Court, Justice
* Professor, University of Virginia.
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
3. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
4. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
5. The convention of referring to the "Rehnquist Court" is followed here, but note
that this convention often creates confusion by suggesting too great an influence of the
Chief Justice and greater stability on the Court than in fact exists. This convention also
distracts from the fact that every time there are changes in the composition of the bench
the Court changes, even if the Chief Justice remains the same. Political scientists
generally analyze the Supreme Court in terms of "natural courts," periods in which the
Court's personnel remain stable. Accordingly, there have been six "Rehnquist Courts."
The first Court was the 1986 Term and the first part of the 1987 Term. The second
Court followed the appointment of Justice Kennedy, the second half of the 1987 Term
and the 1988 and 1989 Terms. The third Court was the 1990 Term which included the
seating of Justice Souter. The fourth Court was after the arrival of Justice Thomas, the
1991 and 1992 Terms. Finally, the fifth and sixth Courts were in the 1993 and 1994
Terms, which each began with the addition of a new Justice-Ginsburg and Breyer,
respectively.
6. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844.
7. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 210 (1995).
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Marshall witnessed a gradual 180-degree turn in direction in a number of
areas of civil rights and liberties. 8 Between 1961 and 1969, more than
seventy-six percent of the Warren Court's decisions each term went in a
liberal direction, protecting individuals and minorities against the
government. 9 Then, during the Burger Court years, in spite of Roe v.
Wade"0 and some other rulings," the percentage of liberally inclined
decisions dropped below fifty percent each term, with one exception. 2
Perhaps even more disturbing for Justice Marshall, who as a young
attorney spear-headed the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund's
drive to end racial discrimination and argued before the Court the
landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,3 was the constitutional
counterrevolution that the emerging Rehnquist Court threatened to put in
place on race relations.
In his last term on the bench, Justice Marshall no longer had the
support of his closest ally, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who retired at
the end of the preceding term. Justice Brennan's absence from the bench
amounted to more than the loss of yet another vote for liberals. During
the course of more than three decades, Justice Brennan championed liberal
legalism and proved to be a master of coalition building within the
Court.' 4 Moreover, in the 1990 term the Court's working majority no
longer appeared compelled to take liberal arguments seriously. More
often than not, they were preoccupied with fighting among themselves
over how far to shift to the right. Justice Antonin Scalia, in particular,
appeared so concerned with taking on more moderate conservatives, like

THE

8. William J. Daniels, Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Racefor Equal Justice, in
BURGER COURT 212, 212-37 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).

9. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the
Conservatismof the Rehnquist Court, 77 JUDICATURE 83, 89 tbl. 1 (1993) (showing that
decisions in civil liberties cases went in a liberal direction 71.4% of the time during the
Warren Court era).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern, The Burger Court and Beyond,
in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 8, at 433, 436. The Burger Court also brought us
well-known decisions in the area of women's rights such as Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
12. Smith & Hensley, supra note 9, at 89 tbl. 2 (showing that less than 50% of the
Burger Court's decisions went in a liberal direction each Term, with the exception of the
1971-1972 Term).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.:Policy-Making in the
Judicial Thicket, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 8, at 100.
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, that he had little time for troubling with
Justice Marshall's protestations.
For his part, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist had waited almost
forty years for the Court's composition to move in his direction. As a law
clerk to Justice Robert H. Jackson during the 1952 term, he wrote a memo
his view that the
dismissing Marshall's arguments in Brown by stating
"separate but equal" doctrine should be upheld. 5 Later, during his
sixteen years as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court, he staked out
other positions on the far right and became known as the "Lone Ranger"
for filing the largest number of solo dissents. 6 Then, in his first four
terms in the center chair, Chief Justice Rehnquist battled for influence
with Justice Brennan over the votes of the Court's centrists. Finally, with
Justice Brennan's departure from the bench and the arrival of the fifth
consecutive appointee, Justice David H. Souter, by a Republican President
since his own appointment in 1972, Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over
an increasingly conservative Court that promised the potential for moving
constitutional law toward his own well-established positions.
Besides Payne in the 1990 term, the Chief Justice commanded a
majority in Board of Education v. Dowell, 17 which held that school
districts previously required by law to eliminate racial segregation could
end forced busing of students in favor of neighborhood schools, even
though that entailed returning to a system of schools enrolling
overwhelmingly either black or white students. And again dissenting,
Justice Marshall was relegated to protesting, in vain, that "vestiges of past
Justice
discrimination" remain in many parts of the country. 8
Marshall's dissents in Payne and Dowell marked the growing distance
between, on the one hand, his and past majorities' liberal vision of
constitutional law and construction of social reality, and, on the other
hand, the emerging majority on the Rehnquist Court.
Dowell, Justice Marshall understood, signaled the beginning of the end
of the Brown era. The Court was carrying over on its docket from past
terms several other school desegregation cases,' 9 including Freeman v.
15.

DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND

CIVIL LIBERTIES 1334 (2d ed. 1995) (reproducing Rehnquist's memo).
16. See A.E. Dick Howard, The Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 68
(stating that Justice Rehnquist "lacked jurisprudential soul mates so often on the Burger
Court that at one point, his law clerks gave him a Lone Ranger doll").
17. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
18. Id. at 262.
19. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Brown, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1990), petition
for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3775 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1990) (arising from the protracted
litigation that began with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Ayers v.
Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990), sub nom U.S. v. Mabus, 499 U.S. 958 (1991),
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Pitts# and Board of Education v. Brown.2" Freeman was scheduled to
be heard the first Monday in October, 1991. When the controversy over
Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment prolonged the confirmation
process for the already controversial nomination of Clarence Thomas as
Justice Marshall's successor,' Marshall had no alternative other than to
abruptly send a letter informing President George Bush of his decision to
retire immediately, thereby allowing the Justice to avoid participating in
the oral arguments in Freeman.
As Justice Marshall foresaw, in Freeman the Rehnquist Court
continued to press Dowell's message that lower federal courts should begin
withdrawing from their supervision of school desegregation efforts and
return complete authority to local school boards.'
Justice Anthony
Kennedy's opinion for an ostensibly unanimous Court represented a rough
compromise on the closing of the Brown era, though another incremental
step in that direction. Less strident and more moderate than either the
Chief Justice or Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy held simply that lower
federal courts may withdraw from supervising discrete categories of school
operations, as identified in 1968 in Green v. County School Board,24
once school districts show compliance with desegregation orders.'
Lower courts, moreover, need not wait for a specified period of years
before doing so or await desegregation in all areas of a school system
before disengaging.' Justice Kennedy's failure to lay down any guidelines
for ending federal courts' supervision of school desegregation prompted
Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion to call for an immediate end to all
petitionfor cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3027 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1991), and Ayers v. Mabus,
499 U.S. 958 (1991), petitionfor cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3027 (Dec. 17, 1990); In re
Louisiana, 501 U.S. 1229 (1991), petitionfor writ of mandamusfiled, 59 U.S.L.W. 3754

(U.S. Apr. 23, 1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989), petition for
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3027 (U.S. Feb. 12i 1990).

20. 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (1969 desegregation case over which the Court retained
jurisdiction to oversee implementation of the desegregation plan).

21. 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (remanding case in light of decision inFreeman v. Pitts).
22. Adam Clymer, Delayingthe Vote: How SenatorsReachedAccord,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1991, at B15.
23. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 498.
24. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (reviewing desegregation plan for local school district and

holding that it failed to comply with the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294 (1954)).
25. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
26. Id. at 490-91.
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judicial supervision of schools that no longer intentionally discriminate. 27
Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, appeared to go too far for Justices
Souter, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor. They countered in separate
concurrences (which read like dissents) that the lower federal courts
should undertake a probing analysis before abandoning their judicial
supervision.'
Three years later, in the 1994 term, the working majority on the
Rehnquist Court continued down the road of Dowell and Freeman in
Missouri v. Jenkins.29 In the meantime, Justice Thomas had joined the
Court as did Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, the first
appointees of a Democratic President in over a quarter of a century,
indeed, since Justice Marshall's appointment. This time around, Chief
Justice Rehnquist commanded only a bare majority to rebuff a federal
district court for exceeding its remedial powers, and to lay down some
guidelines for lower federal courts' withdrawing from supervision over
The four dissenters-Justices
efforts to integrate public schools.3"
Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens-countered that the majority
overreached and firmly rejected the majority's conclusion that lower courts
possess no authority to order improvements in school districts so as to
"Given the deep,
make them more attractive to white students.3
inglorious history of segregation in Missouri," observed Justice Ginsburg,
"to curtail desegregation at this time and in this manner is an action at
once too swift and too soon." 32
Missouri v. Jenkins was, of course, only one of three important
decisions handed down in the 1994 term in which the working majority on
the Rehnquist Court continued to advance its "Constitution is colorblind"
doctrine.33 The two other decisions dealt with voting rights and
affirmative action, but also built on the Rehnquist Court's earlier rulings.
In 1993, writing for a bare majority in Shaw v. Reno,' Justice O'Connor
held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial gerrymandering in
27. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that it is absurd to assume that the

current operation of schools is marred by the long latent constitutional violations).
28. Id. at 507 (Souter, J., concurring); id at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring in which
Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., joined).
29. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
30. Id. at 2051.
31. Id. at 2073 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33. The three cases were Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), and Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995).
34. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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electoral redistricting unless the government demonstrates a "compelling
reason" for creating so-called minority-majority districts." That ruling
was reaffirmed in Miller v. Johnson36 by another bare majority in an
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy that concluded that the creation of
three minority-majority congressional districts in Georgia was not required
under the Voting Rights Act.37
A majority of the Rehnquist Court turned the corner on affirmative
action in Richmond v. J.A. Croson,38 making it much more difficult for
states and localities to defend such programs, and in Northeastern Florida
Contractors v. Jacksonville39 making it easier for white-owned businesses
to attack the constitutionality of such programs. However, in 1990 Justice
Brennan mustered a bare majority in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission to reaffirm earlier decisions holding that
Congress has broader latitude than states and localities when authorizing
affirmative-action programs. But by the 1994 term Justice Stevens was
the only Justice on the bench who voted with the majority. The other four
Justices-Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun-comprising the
majority in Metro Broadcasting, had retired.
With the Court's
composition so dramatically changed in four short years the Rehnquist
Court decided, not surprisingly, to revisit the controversy in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.4' There, a bare majority, in an opinion
announced by Justice O'Connor, discarded Metro Broadcasting,42 holding
instead that the "strict scrutiny" standard applied in Croson to state and
local affirmative-action programs also applies to federal programs.43
Notably, Missouri v. Jenkins,' Miller v. Johnson,4' and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' were decided by the same bare majority:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. That bloc prevailed in six of the sixteen five-to-four decisions
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 2828.
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
Id.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).

40. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
41. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).

42. Id. at 2113.
43. Id. at 2118.
44. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
45. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
46. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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in the 1994 term and voted most frequently together.' By contrast, the
four dissenting justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens-were
able to prevail only if they swung either Justice Kennedy or O'Connor
over to their side." But, they were able to do so in only four of the
sixteen five-to-four splits.49 Not surprisingly, the vote of either or both
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor proved pivotal in determining the
outcome of five-to-four splits; Justice Kennedy was on the winning side
in thirteen and Justice O'Connor in eleven of the sixteen bare majority
decisions.5 0
The point of reviewing this recent history is, of course, to underscore
the fundamental problem with Professor James Simon's thesis. In his
book The Center Holds,5 ' Simon argues that the record of the first eight
terms of the Rehnquist Court was that of "a conservative judicial
revolution that failed."5" And he persists in his Solomon lecture. 3 That
he does so seems all the more strange given the Court's major rulings in
its 1994 term.' Simon does note that The New York Times end-of-theterm article took the contrary view-it is summed up in its title "Farewell
to the Old Order on the Court: The Right Goes Activist and the Center Is
a Void" 5 5-and that a good number of the reviewers of his book were
quick to point out that the term's decisions undermined his thesis.5 6 Far
47. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REv. 111, 343

tbl. I(D) (1995).
48. Id.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
SIMON, supra note 7.
Id.at 11.
See James F. Simon, Politics and the Rehnquist Court, delivered as the Sixth

Annual Solomon Lecture at New York Law School (Oct. 31, 1995), in40 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 863 (1996) (-I... [remain] ... unrepentant... even considering last term's
Court decisions ....).
54. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115
S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
55. Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order on the Court: The Right Goes
Activist and the CenterIs a Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E4 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court "reexamin[ed]" basic Constitutional principles in the 1994-95 Term).
56. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, How Nino, Tony, the Chief, et. al., Make
Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at C26 (ridiculing the proposition that "the center

held because there was always a majority in the center"); David C. Frederick, The
Documents inthe Case, WASH. POST BOOK REV., Sept. 17, 1995, at 6 (suggesting that
"decisions handed down last term cast doubt on the proposition that the 'center' has
held"); Curtis Gannon, Instructive Glimpses of an Evolving Court, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
9, 1995, at D3 (noting that conservative decisions on affirmative action and on
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from undermining his thesis, though, he counters that the 1994 term's
rulings and the Justices' voting patterns support his conclusion that "the
center of gravity on this Court is not located on the right wing, where
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas reside, but, instead, where O'Connor and
Kennedy sit.""7
The fundamental problem with Simon's thesis stems from his failure
to analyze how the center of the Court shifts with changes in the
composition of the bench. He correctly notes that on several major issues
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor cast the deciding votes. 8 They are also
more moderately conservative jurists-in the tradition of, for example,
Justice Felix Frankfurter-than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas. The latter appear to share a conservative vision that opposes
liberal legalism and lends itself to judicial activism-activism whether in
terms of overturning precedents or second-guessing elected representatives
and the democratic process, as in last term's decisions in Miller v.
Johnso5 9 and Adarand Constructors.'0
Compared to the three justices on their right, who might be deemed
"visionaries" of a kind of conservative judicial activism (comparable, but
running contrary to liberal visionaries such as Justices Brennan and
Marshall), Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are "legal technicians" without
rigid agendas. As such, they are more deferential to precedents and far
more moderate in their opinion writing, as their opinions in the above
cases demonstrate. That is also to agree with Simon, among others, that
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have moderated (and will continue, in the
near term at least, to moderate) the march to the right on abortion, racial
Congressional power over interstate commerce in the last term portend for "another right

turn"); David J.Garrow, The Center Folds, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1995, at 33 (arguing
that recent decisions injure Professor Simon's otherwise "admirable" book); David
Andrew Price, Looking Closely at the High Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at A8
(suggesting that "pity" is in order for Professor Simon's thesis following recent
decisions); Jeffrey Rosen, Disorder in the Court, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Aug. 20,

1995, at 10 (suggesting that the conservatives on the Court have cemented their
majority).
57. Simon, supra note 53, at 875.
58. SIMON, supra note 7, at 163 (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (judgment limiting state regulations of abortions before viability to those which
did not place an "undue burden" on a woman)); id. at 63, 64 (Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did not apply to acts
of racial harassment committed in connection with employment)); id. at 287 (Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that a commencement prayer violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause)).
59. 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
60. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
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gerrymandering, affirmative action, judicial supervision of school
desegregation, and other issues.
To argue, as Simon does, however, that "the center of gravity on this
Court is not located on the right wing,... but, instead, where O'Connor
and Kennedy sit"6" does not support the thesis that the Rehnquist Court's
record is that of "a conservative judicial revolution that failed."62 When
the Court is sharply split on highly contested issues, one or two Justices
at the center inexorably determine the outcome. Justice Potter Stewart
played that role for a while,63 whereas Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and
Byron White later came to play that role in the 1980s on a large number
Still, it is trivial, indeed tautological, to
of social-civil rights issues.'
argue that centrists control the Court when the Justices are otherwise
sharply divided. Moreover, the critical and moderating role that Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor have come to play does not prove that "the
conservative judicial revolution"' s failed. At most, they have tempered
the Rehnquist Court's rulings and its movement to the right.
Part of Simon's problem stems from his failure to analyze (and in his
Solomon lecture to concede) how much the balance of power within the
Court has shifted in recent years. In other words, he fails to analyze the
Rehnquist Court within the broader context of the institutional dynamics
of judicial politics brought by changes in the Court's composition and
appears to underestimate the doctrinal changes forged in any number of
areas. In contrast to The Los Angeles Times reporter David Savage's,
1992 book, Turning Right,6 The Center Holds aims to persuade the
reader that the Rehnquist Court has not turned that far to the right. As
such, Simon is a kind of apologist for the Rehnquist Court, for what the
centrists achieved and what they prevented.
The fact is that the Court and its centrists have become more and
more conservative over the last quarter of a century. While the Burger
61. Simon, supra note 53, at 875.
62. SIMON, supra note 7, at 11.
63. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., A Balance Wheel on the Court, 95 YALE L.J. 1325
(1986) (describing Justice Stewart as a "moderate, swing vote, pithy and witty writer").
64. Burt Neuborne, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1630, 1632 (Leon

Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (stating that "[o]perating from the center, Justice
Powell often casts the balance-of-power vote that controlled the Court"); Robert H.

Freilich, Reagan'sLegacy:A ConservativeMajority Rules on CivilRights, CivilLiberties
and State and Local GovernmentIssues, 21 URB. L. 633, 669 (1989) (describing Justice
White as the swing vote on Eleventh Amendment issues).
65. SIMON, supra note 7, at 11.

66.

(1995).

DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
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Court extended the right of privacy in Roe v. Wade67 and expanded
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as approved
busing6" and most affirmative-action
programs,6 9 the Warren Court's
7

"revolution in criminal procedure" " came to a halt after Republican

President Richard M. Nixon's four appointees and, then the retirement of

Justice William 0. Douglas and the appointment of his replacement,
Justice Stevens, in 1975. With Ronald Reagan's first appointee, Sandra

Day O'Connor, in 1981, the Court became even more conservative on
most matters of criminal procedure7 ' and has largely remained so, if not
become increasingly so, in the last decade.
Then, in 1986, Reagan, in a symbolic and strategic move, elevated
Rehnquist from Associate to Chief Justice and named the no less
conservative Scalia to fill his seat. Precisely because Justice Powell had

cast the crucial fifth vote on abortion,' affirmative action, 73 and other
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that courts have
broad equitable powers to remedy past wrongs, including the use of busing to remedy
past discriminatory state legislation).
69. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that federal
statute requiring 10% set-aside of federal grants for minority businesses in public works
projects was constitutional); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(holding that a state university may take race into account in its admissions standards).
But cf. Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that teachers' collective
bargaining agreement which provided for the maintenance of racial proportions without
reference to seniority during periods of layoffs violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, Federal CriminalLaw: The Need, Notfor Revised
Constitutional Theory or New CongressionalStatutes, But the Exercise of Responsible
ProsecutiveDiscretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1209 (1995); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. Rv. 355, 408 (1995).
71. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (holding that Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit jury instructions informing jury of Governor's
power to commute capital sentence); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (holding that
reversal of felony conviction based on weight of evidence does not preclude retrial on
double jeopardy principles); see also Sue Davis, The Voice of SandraDay O'Connor, 77
JUDICATURE 134, 137 (1993) (stating that "O'Connor and Rehnquist voted together in
a greater percentage of cases involving criminal procedure (87.2 percent) than they did
in cases concerning either civil rights (62.2 percent) or the Establishment Clause (52.9
percent).").
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
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social-civil rights issues in the mid-1980s,74 Reagan's nomination of the
well-known hard-line conservative critic of the Warren and Burger Courts,
Judge Robert H. Bork,75 set off a storm of controversy that contributed
to ultimately defeating his confirmation.76 Although not a conservative
visionary of the law like Bork or Scalia, Justice Kennedy was,
nonetheless, more conservative than the justice he replaced. And that is
the point: As more conservatives joined the Court, its jurisprudential
center shifted-in decided and lasting ways. Old alignments and centers
of agreement folded; new ones emerged and shifted, holding momentarily,
until the Court's composition further changed.
None of this analysis is new, though its significance appears either to
escape Simon or he has sought to evade fully coming to terms with it.
The center has not held, except in the trivial sense noted above. Instead,
"the center of gravity" on the Court shifted to the right, and along with
it the Court's centrists have become more conservative, even while
declining to always go as far as the Court's right wing. The Court's right
wing, moreover, has grown from one to three, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Measured in terms of decisions in which the Justices split five-to-four,
and thus representing the sharpest ideological divisions, the Court has
rather steadily moved in Chief Justice Rehnquist's direction, except for
one term. 7 Not surprisingly, the Justices voting most often with the
majority shifted from Justices Powell and White to Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor. Still, as indicated below, Chief Justice Rehnquist in the last
three terms was on the prevailing side of bare majority decisions an
average of sixty-eight percent of the time, slightly down from the seventy
74. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that introduction
of victim-impact statement at sentencing phase of capital trial violated Eighth
Amendment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that life sentence without
parole for seventh nonviolent felony conviction, imposed by state recidivism statute,
violates Eighth Amendment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that state
statute denying free public education to illegal alien children was unconstitutional).
75. Former Judge Robert H. Bork served on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia from 1982 to 1988.
76. President Reagan nominated Judge Bork for the United States Supreme Court
on July 1, 1987. Beginning on September 15, 1987, the Senate Judiciary Committee
elicited twelve days of testimony as to the nomination, and on October 6, voted to
recommend the rejection of the nominee by a vote of 9-5. The Senate formally rejected
the nomination by a vote of 42-58 on October 23, 1987, after 23 hours of floor debate.
GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrrTIoNAL LAW app. B-6, 7 (12th ed. 1991).
77. In 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted with the minority in approximately 72%
of the decisions in which the Court acted upon a bare majority. Since his ascension to
Chief Justice in 1986, 1991 remains the only year in which Rehnquist found himself in
the minority in those cases commanding a 5-4 split.
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percent average during his first five years as Chief Justice but well above
his average of fifty-five percent during the last five years of the Burger
Court:
Table 171

Justice & FreqTerm
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981

Number of
5:4 Decisions
15
13
18
14
21
39
33
12
45
36
19
28
33
31

Frequency Percentage
Rehnquist in Majority
60
69
77
28
71
66
81
75
60
63
57
60
57
38

uency Percentage
in Majority
Kennedy
Kennedy
Scalia
Souter
O'Connor
White
White
White
Powell
Powell/O'Connor
Powell
White
White
Stevens

86
92
77
92
71
76
78
91
75
75
73
78
75
74

Simon is no doubt wedded to his thesis because his book is based on
a series of anecdotes about how Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, along
with Justice Souter, in PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
78. The Supreme Court,1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. Rv. 111, 343
tbl. I(D) (1995); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARv. L. REV.
139, 372 tbl. I(D) (1994); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 144, 372 tbl. I(D) (1993); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106
HARV. L. REv. 163, 378 tbl. I(D) (1992); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading
Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 419 tbl. I(D) (1991); The Supreme Court, 1989 TermLeading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REV. 129, 359 bl. I(D) (1990); The Supreme Court, 1988
Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv. 137, 394 tbl. I(D) (1989); The Supreme Court,
1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 350 tbl. I(D) (1988); The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 362 tbl. I(D) (1987); The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 304 tbl. I(D)
(1986); The Supreme Court,1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 322 tbl.
I(D) (1985); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 307
tbl. I(D) (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Leading Cases, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70,
295 tbl. I(D) (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Leading Cases, 96 HARV. L. REV.
62, 304 tbl. I(D) (1982).
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v. Casey,7 9 declined to march in step with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia and, after his arrival on the bench in 1991, Justice
Thomas.'
The stories are engaging and lively, based on internal
memoranda located in Justice Marshall's papers at the Library of Congress
and Simon's interviews with "confidential sources."8" But, the problem
remains that Simon overstates his argument and minimizes the broader
drift to the right, along with its significance for the Court and the country.
Simon, for instance, ably describes the power struggles within the
Court over whether it should reach out in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union' to overrule Runyon v. McCrary," a 1976 Burger Court ruling
holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 extends to private schools that
refuse to admit blacks.A4 In the end, writing for a bare majority, Justice
Kennedy declined both to overturn Runyon or to extend the Act's coverage
beyond barring discrimination in hiring and firing to also bar racial
harassment and discrimination as a condition of employment. I The
result was decidedly conservative, even though it did not go as far as
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia wanted to go. 6 But, Simon
concludes, "if Runyon had been overruled, it would have truly signaled a
revolutionary conservative movement."' Well, yes and no. The hard
push in the conservative direction was in fact signaled when the Rehnquist
Court (without Justice Kennedy, who was yet to be nominated and
confirmed) heard oral arguments in Patterson in 1987 and then (after
Justice Kennedy's confirmation) a bare majority voted to carry the case
over to the next term for reargument and directed counsel to consider
whether Runyon should be reversed. Four justices-Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens-dissented from that order, warning of the
emergence of a new majority that threatened to no longer take precedents
seriously."8 Even though the final result fell short of overturning
Runyon, the result was nonetheless a victory for conservatives, which, as
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
SIMON, supra note 7, at 154-67.
SIMON, supra note 7, at 305-17.
491 U.S. 164 (1989).
427 U.S. 160 (1976). See SIMON, supra note 7, at 305.
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174.
Id. at 177.
SIMON, supra note 7, at 67.
Simon, supra note 53, at 866 (emphasis added).
Patterson, 485 U.S. 617, 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Simon notes, Congress overruled with the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.89
The controversy over Patterson'spossible reversal of Runyon and the
potential reversal of Roe v. Wade' in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services9' continued two years later in Payne v. Tennessee' and into
the following term in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.' The Rehnquist
Court became deeply embroiled over the controversy, attracting the
attention of scholars and the media. 4 No less angry than Justice
Marshall's dissent in Payne," Justice Scalia's concurrence in Webster
was especially biting in its attack of Justice O'Connor's reluctance to
overrule Roe.96 Moreover, the controversy over the doctrine of stare
decisis grew so hot that even the retired (and reserved conservative)
Justice Powell entered the fray. In his 1989 lecture before the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Justice Powell addressed the
controversy and cautioned that abandoning the doctrine "would undermine
the rule of law."'
As the controversy played out, it undoubtedly
contributed to the fragmentation (and concomitantly, to the subsequent
moderation) of the Rehnquist Court, and also inspired the plurality opinion
issued by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in Casey.98
Patterson and its attendant controversy over the Rehnquist Court's
reversal of precedents, according to Simon, counts as evidence supporting
his thesis that the conservative revolution failed." ° And in his Solomon
lecture, he further emphasizes that "most of the decisions of the past three
decades ... have been preserved." 0 Yet, once again, he minimizes the
89. SIMON, supra note 7, at 80 (the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending both the

Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964, effectively overruled Patterson by barring racial

harassment and other forms of bias even after a person is hired. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105
Stat. 1071).
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91. 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).

92. 501 U.S. 808 (1990).
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
94. See SIMON, supranote 7, at 163-65.

95. 501 U.S. at 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 492 U.S. at 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., StareDecisis and JudicidlSelf-Restraint, 44 REC. ASS'N
B. CITY OF N.Y. 813 (1989).

98. See SIMON, supra note 7, at 163-66.
99. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
100. SIMON, supra note 7, at 79-81.

101. Simon, supra note 53, at 864.
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broader context of the controversy over Patterson and other cases in order
to minimize the shift to the right and thereby manufacture support for his
thesis. In the first years of the Rehnquist Court, there was a push-a hard
push by the Reagan administration, in both its judicial appointments and
litigation strategies-to reverse liberal precedents. As evident below,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia had considerable success in
marshalling the Court in that direction, particularly after the addition of
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. In the first four terms of the
Rehnquist Court, eleven precedents were abandoned and fourteen more in
the next three terms. There were none in the 1993 term and only one in
the 1994 term. But that does not show that the center held. To the
contrary, the center folded, shifted with the new appointments of
Presidents Reagan and Bush, and then drew the line anew.
Table II
The Rehnquist Court's Reversal of Precedents
Newly Appointed Justice
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer

Term

Precedents
Overturned

1986
1987-1989
1990
1991-1992
1993
1994

3
8
7
7
1

Retiring Justice
Powell
Brennan
Marshall
White
Blackmun

In historical perspective, the Rehnquist Court's reversal of prior
rulings registers the politics of changes in the composition of the
bench." And in this regard the Rehnquist Court's record remains far
from exceptional. When the Court's composition changes dramatically in
a short period of time, or a pivotal Justice leaves the bench, the Court
tends to overturn prior rulings."0 3 The Warren Court's record, like the
Rehnquist Court's, underscores how crucial the timing of one or two
changes on the bench may prove for the Court's direction and its
From its landmark 1954 school
reconsideration of precedents.
102. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent:An Analysis of
JUDICATURE 262 (1992); see, e.g., DAVID M.

NaturalCourts and Reversal Trends, 75

O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996).

103. See David M. O'Brien, The Nation; After a Furious Battle for Control,
Centrists Win Out on High Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at 2.
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desegregation ruling in Brown, 'I to the appointment of Justice Stewart
in 1959, only six precedents were reversed." ° With Justice Stewart's
arrival, six more were overturned in the next four years."° In 1962, the
composition of the bench changed again with Democratic President John
F. Kennedy's appointments of Justices White and Goldberg. In the
remaining seven years, another twenty were reversed"° as the Warren
Court pushed constitutional law in even more liberal and egalitarian
directions and forged its so-called "revolution in criminal procedure" with
decisions like Mapp v. Ohio,"0 8
Gideon v. Wainwright, 9 and
Miranda v. Arizona."' During Chief Justice Burger's tenure, the Court
became more conservative, particularly in the area of criminal
procedure."' And as its composition changed, the Burger Court also
continued reconsidering precedents-though typically liberal
ones-reversing a total of fifty-two prior rulings. "
Besides minimizing or otherwise dismissing the Rehnquist Court's
reversal of precedents, Simon considers as support for his thesis that the
Rehnquist Court more often merely narrowed precedents. Specifically, in
his Solomon lecture, he contends that "the Warren Court's most
controversial criminal procedure decisions, such as Mapp v. Ohio and
Miranda v. Arizona, remained on the books and did not appear to be in
peril.""' Yet, once again, Simon underestimates the toll taken on the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of the accused and the reversal of
direction taken by the Rehnquist Court.
104. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
105. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 102, at 262-66.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court).
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent defendant in a
criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair
trial, and consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment).

110. 384 U.S. 436 (1965) (holding that the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his or her freedom of action in any significant way, unless the prosecution demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination).

111. See SIMON, supra note 7, at 171-72.
112. Banks, supra note 102, at 266 (stating that "the Burger Court had more
overturns (52) than [the Warren Court] (45)").
113. Simon, supra note 53, at 869.
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Although Mapp and Miranda survive, their importance has been
diminished by rulings of the Burger Court" 4 and, to an even greater
extent, the Rehnquist Court."5 Simply put, they are unlikely to be
overruled precisely because the Rehnquist Court sees no need to do so
since it has sharply cut back on the scope of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, as well as carved out numerous exceptions to Mapp and
Miranda.116 For example, Mapp's exclusionary rule is no longer
triggered when, in cases like California v. Hodari D.,
a majority of
the Rehnquist Court denies that a "search or seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment occurred when undercover police, without even
a "reasonable suspicion" for questioning or detaining an individual, chased
a youth who ran away at the sight of them and after tackling him to the
ground discovered drugs, which were introduced as evidence against him
at his trial." 8 Hodari D. is but one of many rulings in which the
Rehnquist Court has contracted the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures."" 9 Notably, in
its 1994 ruling, the Rehnquist Court also extended the "good-faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule in Arizona v. Evans"2 to include
police reliance on mistaken computer records of an outstanding arrest
warrant.''
Much the same has occurred with respect to Miranda.
Pennsylvania v. Bruder,' for example, held that police do not have to
honor Miranda when making routine traffic stops that result in a driver's
arrest." Nor do police any longer have to use the exact language of
Miranda when informing suspects of their rights, according to the
Rehnquist Court in Duckworth v. Eagan.24
114. Court Didn't Shift to Right, Powell Says: Justices Under Burger Extended
Liberal Rulings, He Declares, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1986, at 2.
115. See Glen Elsasser, Supreme CourtSays Juveniles Can be Executed, CHI. TRIB.,
June 27, 1989, at 1.
116. See, e.g., Ronald Collins, Bork andMiranda:DistortingPrecedenttoOverrule
It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 1987, at 13.
117. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
118. Id. at 623.
119. Ruth Marcus, RightsDiscardedWith Evidence, Court Says, WASH. POST,Apr.
24, 1991, at A4.
120. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
121. Id. at 1193.
122. 488 U.S. 9 (1988).
123. Id. at 11 (holding that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for the
purposes of Miranda).
124. 492 U.S. 195 (holding that the specific warnings contained in Miranda need
not be applied in the exact form as described in that decision).
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Rather than outrightly reversing precedents, the Rehnquist Court has
more frequently narrowed them or reinterpreted them in ways that
nevertheless virtually reverse them without explicitly saying so. The
strategy has also prevailed in other areas besides Mapp and Miranda. In
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio-an important ruling making it
more difficult for minorities to prove on-the-job bias and a ruling which
was subsequently overridden by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of
19911--a bare majority of the Rehnquist Court held that statistics could
no longer be used to prove discrimination, and further stated that earlier
decisions such as Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 27 "should have been
understood to mean" that!1
Simon, however, minimizes or dismisses the significance and the
cumulative effect of these shifts to the right. Although he tells engaging
stories of the Rehnquist Court's years, he offers less than a critical and
probing analysis and miscalculates in concluding that "Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer have solidified the moderate center of this Court." 29 That,
of course, was not borne out in the 1994 term, as the Rehnquist Court
continued doggedly down the road charted in earlier terms, though,
admittedly, more slowly and cautiously, due to Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, than desired by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas. While Simon remains "unrepentant" 3 ' about his analysis,
conservatives have much less cause for their disappointment with the
Rehnquist Court than they think; liberals have more cause for discomfort
than they take from Simon's book; and all have reason to doubt the
soundness of his conclusions about changes in constitutional law and
judicial politics.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

490 U.S. 642 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1991).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
SIMON, supra note 7, at 303.
See Simon, supra note 53 and accompanying text.

